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ABSTRACT 
        The innovation of P2P technology in digital world challenges the present copyright 
institutions and retailers. People are declined to look for the protection from the 
traditional law in digital circumstance. As the trend of extending copyright protection 
term across the world, most intellectual property institutions implement new technologies 
to deal with such situation. This paper uses a panel of country-level data to investigate the 
extent to which this is a consequence of the extension of copyright protection. Utilizing 
the economic model, the analysis suggests that the economic effects of implementing 
DRM technology are generally negative, albeit uncertain. The available evidence 
suggests the implementation of the technologies like DRM (Digital Rights Management) 
in copyright protection is likely to have little significant effects on music sales. The key 
factors that may have impact on music sales include Population, GDP, Internet 
Penetration and Domestic Piracy. Confronting the impact of new technological 
innovation, there might be temporarily declination in music industry and confusion in 
digital property protection system, but a balancing situation will finally be reached. 
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As Steve Moore said in <The Truth about Music Business>:  
           “The future is uncertain…” 1 
           There's probably no issue in the entertainment industry that causes more dispute 
today than digital property rights. This is the realm of copyright law dealing with 
materials that have been developed with newer digital technologies. With the invention of 
newer and faster technologies, especially computers, anyone can copy CDs that they have 
legally acquired and then burn copies to give to others. With the use of convenient 
Internet connections at home with computer, almost anyone can copy, distribute, and 
share files with impunity, and the music industry is facing much bigger challenges. 
Recording company even claims: “the unabated Internet piracy could mean the end of the 
industry as a whole.”2  
        Contrary to traditional form of recording products, digital music on file-sharing 
networks can be separated from their physical support, compressed and exchanged on the 
internet in a short time, that is, substantially faster than by renting a CD in a media library 
or than by borrowing from friends. Facing such a threat, record companies have begun to 
sue Internet users who share copyrighted files illegally on Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks 
                                                 
1  See Steeve Moore, The Truth about Music Business, June 2002, Chapter 6. 
2  See www.riaa.org, RIAA Key stats Facts 2006 
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freely without the authorization of copyright holders.  
At the same time, technology companies are developing technological measures 
of protection, one of which known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), to control the 
uses of music in digital format. A paradox is born then. On the one hand, new 
technologies of information and communication increase the value of information goods 
for consumers who can download songs anywhere at anytime. On the other hand, new 
Copyrights Management technologies can restrict and even lock the use of digital music 
licensed to consumers. At its core, DRM technology allows a copyright holder to define a 
set of rules attached to a product in a digital format that control consumer access and 
manipulation of that product. Various rules control the ability to copy, archive, and 
distribute digital works.3 The goal of this paper is to understand the reasons of the 
paradox and to analyze the economic effects of the new technologies bringing in the 
record industry. In determining the effects of DRM, the analysis will rest firmly on the 
relationship between DRM technology and the music sales in main formats. The hope is 
to suggest whether music sales fact in the realm of copyright protection should support or 
impede music industry investment in the development of DRM technologies.  
Several points should be noted at the outset. First, this paper will focus its analysis 
solely on music, excluding all other types of copyrighted properties produced and 
distributed in digital formats. The reason is that many studies on DRM have based their 
analysis on improper or overly simplistic assumptions about all kinds of intellectual 
                                                 
3  See the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, Copyright and Digital 
Media in a Post-Napster World, August 2003, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/uploads/ 
254/2003-05.pdf. 
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properties. Focusing on music exclusively will provide concrete examples that refute 
those assumptions. Moreover, the recording industry is on the front line of the war 
against copyright piracy and online file sharing, the very behavior DRM is intended to 
stop. Second, this paper will be rather speculative in its description of the music 
industry’s implementation of DRM technology. Though various methods of DRM 
implementation currently exist, DRM technology has not yet provided all of the 
technological protections. Thus, in looking toward the DRM solutions future effects, one 
necessarily must speculate as to the nature of its implementation.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II will introduce the rise and the 
development of digital technology in the global recording industry. Section III provides 
an overview of the empirical literature examining the effects of DRM technology and file 
sharing in recording industry. Section IV describes the data for empirical analysis. Next 
I’ll describe the econometric approach and its purpose in Section V. Section VI shows the 
results according to the designed approach, and Section VII discusses the implications of 










II DRM Technology in Recording Industry 
In the digital media realm, digital rights management (DRM) systems are used by 
content-holders to control the access to and use of music or other forms of digital content. 
DRM technology essentially allows content-holders to set and improve rules about what 
users can and cannot do with digital content either from the Internet or on physical media 
such as CDs or DVDs. The initial rationale for DRM was mainly to stop large-scale 
copyright infringement over peer-to-peer networks. However, other justifications like 
price discrimination and system innovation have been identified recently.4 
While DRM is most commonly used by the entertainment industry (e.g. film and 
recording), it has found use in other situations as well. Many online music stores, such as 
Apple's iTunes Store, as well as certain e-book publishers, have imposed DRM on their 
customers.5 In recent years, a large number of television companies have imposed DRM 
systems on consumer’s electronic devices, to control access to the free broadcast content 
of their shows. 
Traditional DRM schemes regulate the interoperability between digital products 
and services.6 In order to serve its purposes, it is also designed to create a certain degree 
of incompatibility. Depending on the result of DRM schemes, the certain level of 
                                                 
4  See Ed Felten, DRM Wars: the Next Generation, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1501. 
5  See www.noteburner.com, http://www.noteburner.com/ protected-wma-mp3/convert-protected-
wma-file-to-mp3 
6  See Ed Felten, DRM Wars: the Next Generation, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1502. 
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interoperability may lead to a positive or negative result. 
DRM systems allow digital music consumers to transfer their music collection 
from different devices, or to change between different vendors. On the contrary, it is 
more difficult to change platforms in non-interoperable DRM systems.  DRM system is 
designed to reduce prices and to stimulate product and service innovation7. Additionally, 
higher levels of DRM interoperability would increase potential competition by reducing 
entry barriers of the market for new players. As a result, higher levels of DRM 
interoperability might lead to higher consumption and thus let companies to enter the 
music market with innovative products and services to improve their market share 
through product differentiation. 
However, the basic purpose of Implementing DRM system doesn’t go well as it is 
expected. Figure 2.1 show the average price of CDs of Top 7 music consumption 
countries in music market from 2001 to 2007, we can see that the price of CDs in these 
countries are not simply declining after implementing DRM technology. The prices 
would temporarily rise after DRM implementation and then fall down. And the average 
CD prices in Germany, France and Japan are still increasing after 2007, which is beyond 
the prediction of DRM investors.  As I mentioned before, DRM system is designed to 
reduce music price, but from this figure we cannot say the results satisfy the music 
industry. 
                                                 
7  See the argument of Bomsel & Geffroy, supra note 30, that DRM incompatibility may 
represent a form of “moral hazard,” resulting in a failure to maximize welfare. For a discussion of 
potentially detrimental effects on innovation if intellectual property rights are used principally as 
strategic weapons which arguably is facilitated in the age of new technologies, see: Strategic 
Behaviors and Competition, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstractid=586483. 
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The effect of DRM technology on the piracy issues in global recording market 
seems also not very significant. We can see from Figure 1, as the share of DRM 
penetration increases, the units of pirate CDs and digital music are still growing until the 
period after 2006 when several online music companies decided to sell DRM-free music 
products. However, we could not draw conclusions based on this trend that DRM 
technology has little effects on piracy issues in music industry, there might be other 
factors working on this result. 
 

















Piracy is always the greatest pain for the recording industry: The Economist 
(2003) predicts that file sharing systems would cause the music industry about 15.4 
billion dollars potential revenues in 2010. Despite the disappearing of ’free’ online file-
sharing company Napster, and any other company that would supply similar service 
online, it’s said that Internet song swapping is going to stay (Lyman 2002).  
The new versions of P2P networks will be able to guard the identity of the users, 
which is also its selling point. After years of struggling, the music business has made big 
moves in dealing with piracy. The major labels began to license music products to several 
legal download services, starting with the iTunes site Apple Computer Inc in April 2003. 
Musicmatch Downloads and the RealPlayer Music Store are never far behind for any 
chance of online music trade. The big retailers Wal-Mart Stores, Virgin Group, and 
Amazon.com launched their own online stores after (Business Week 2004 b). The online 
availability becomes wider, but the threat of legal actions is convincing music fans.  
Network effects have been used to justify non-protection in a monopoly (Conner 
and Rumelt 1991) and duopoly environment (Shy and Thisse 1999). The ideas of these 
papers are: The more consumers are using the same product, the higher utility they hold. 
Hence, a higher price can be imposed on the legal buyers, if the firm ’allows’ the good to 
be pirated. The members of the network could be legal or illegal software users, and the 
utility to all consumers increases with the size of the network. If the NE benefits are high 
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enough, then zero protection may be optimal. In the other papers focus on network 
externalities (Conner and Rumelt 1991; Shy and Thisse 1999), protection may be optimal 
if NE is high enough. In the work cited above, protection increases the cost of pirating by 
raising the cost of breaking these protections. 
The reduced utility that a consumer gets from consuming a DRM protected good 
is related to indirect approprobility (Liebowitz 1985) and shared information goods 
pricing (Bakos et. al 1999). About the concept of indirect appropriability, take libraries 
for example, many users may want to pay for one journal, thus the author can charge a 
library a higher price to any individual who purchases the journal. A similar method is 
used for the pricing of shared information goods by Bakos et.al. (1999). DRM restricts 
the number of copies available and the types of devices as music players. As a result, 
consumers may get a lower utility from the music protected through DRM.  
Pirated copies could be used to evaluate originals when its quality is unknown 
before (Chellappa and Shivendu 2003, Takeyama 2003). The value provided by the 
pirated copy could help the sales of the original version, if the net surplus from the 
original exceeds its value. The ’harm’ from unauthorized shared information goods may 
be overstated, because the information value of the copy is countrd for all (Takeyama 
2003). Chellappa and Shivendu (2003) find that losses due to piracy are more severe for 
digital goods that do not live up to their hype. Empirical studies are turned to the impact 
of piracy on music sales. For example Hui and Png (2003), using a data set for sale of 
music CDs worldwide, find that demand for music CDs declined with piracy. This 
indicates that the negative effects of piracy outweigh the positive sides. Another study 
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(Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2004) finds that Internet music piracy won’t do harm to 
legal CD sales, it may even boost some types of music sales. The main rationale is that 
the consumers who download music on the file-sharing network are usually college 
students, who prefer not to buy a CD otherwise. By the P2P network, they can evaluate 
music free and then decide to buy the CD if they like it. Thus, the file-sharing network 
could stimulate demand. 
A recent paper (Chen and Png 2003), studies the problem of a social planner who 
has three policy choices: to tax the copying medium, to subsidize legal sales and to fine 
offenders. Providing subsidies to users is found to be welfare maximizing, compared to 
taxing the copying medium, or penalizing copiers. Gopal and Sanders (1997), distinguish 
between preventive and deterrent measures to fight software piracy and show in a setting 
with club formation that using deterrent measures is optimal. The intuition is related to 
club formation: the firm cannot extract a higher price from each individual, part of the 
club, using preventive controls. The reverse is true for deterrent measures. Novos and 
Waldman (1984) look at the classic trade-off problem in copyright literature - the 
incentives of the copyright holders vs. efficient consumption of the good - from an 
alternate perspective. They measure ‘production efficiency’ in terms of the quality of the 
good rather than the more traditional quantity of goods produced by creators. They study 
the impact of piracy on the quality choices by a firm, and find that quality choices are 
below the socially optimal level in the presence of piracy. Additionally under certain 
conditions, the quality choice increases with the level of protection used by the firm.  
A recent working paper (Sundararajan 2003) considers the detrimental impact of 
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DRM protection on the quality of the product. The paper finds that a seller’s choice of 
optimal level of protection when she can price discriminate, would always be less than 
the protection level that maximizes the quality difference between its own product and 
the pirated good. Additionally it finds that if the DRM technology weakens with time 
(which is to be expected if hackers have more time to overcome DRM), then the optimal 
strategy may involve either increasing or decreasing the level of protection, depending on 
















In this study, I focus on a sample of music sales in 15 countries from year 2001 to 
2007 according to IFPI, RIAA reports and other digital commerce research 
organizations.8 The 15 countries in the later empirical analysis represent countries with 
the largest markets in the recording industry (in value), accounting for more than 90% of 
the world market value.9 Data on music sales and DRM usage have been obtained from 
RIAJ. The data are representative of main commercially relevant forms of music on sale, 
allowing me to draw meaningful inferences about DRM technology impact on overall 
music sales. Data on population, Domestic piracy, GDP, and Internet access were drawn 
from the Census Bureau’s yearbook from 2001 to 2007. Annual music statistics from 
RIAA offers data of variable music sales and changes, including digital music sales from 
Internet.  
Although these years were chosen mainly because of data availability, they are 
also very good for conceptual reasons. It does not seem relevant to look at data prior to 
2001 since DRM management technology, a prerequisite for large-scale Internet piracy, 
                                                 
8  These institutions include RIAJ (Recording Industry Association in Japan), BPI (British 
Phonographic Industry), US Bureau of the Census, WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organization) and business research companies like Forrester, Soundscan. 
9  The countries are USA, Japan, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherland, Belgium, 
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Australia, Canada, and Taiwan. Although China is listed as one of the 
top 10 digital markets in the world (IFPI 2007 report), ranked 10th with 1.96% of the world sales, 
it is an outlier with poor Internet piracy though the Internet penetration rate is high, and Chinese 
GDP is a poor measure of disposable income across the population.  
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only appeared apparently in the second half of 2001. The year 2001 and 2002 represents 
the Pre-DRM period, while file sharing had already become entrenched since 2000, and 
DRM systems have not greatly been developed and implemented in music realm. The 
time starts from 2003 marked an after-DRM period, as most of the countries in my 
database started to implement DRM system or similar technology in recording industry.10 
Since my model will be estimated based on the changes during DRM technology is 
applied, it would be estimating the effects that coincide with the rise of file sharing.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Global Music Sales in value (in million US$) 
 
                                                 
10  See Appendix 2, The Timeline of DRM technology in the world. 
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Figure 4.2 Percentage of main formats of Music Unit Sales (in millions) 
One of the good properties of those years is that CDs are the clearly dominant 
medium for recorded music. Measuring the changes in CD sales will give a good picture 
on how various factors affect the music industry. Also, CD sales are not trending over the 
years studied. This is desirable because it means the model will not register misleading 
correlations between CDs and variables like income and population that have a strong 
time trend. Besides, the Downloaded music from online shops also plays an important 
role in the recording industry after the development of file sharing. Figure1 and 2 shows 
that the numbers of CD sales and digital sales become almost the same in 2006, and the 
digital share of the total music market has risen from only two per cent in 2000 to around 
48.6 percent in 2007,11 so counting digital music sales should make the DRM effect 
analysis more reliable. 
                                                 




To estimate the shifting effect of DRM on music sales, I focus on demand 
shifters, and particularly on factors related to file sharing and DRM technology. To frame 
what follows, I begin by using OLS estimation and time series model as means of 
highlighting the issues involved with estimating the effect of DRM on music sales. The 
simplest model of the relationship between sales and file sharing with DRM is a model of 
equation (1). V is music sales (Singles, DVDs, CDs, Digital music, etc), Internet 
Penetration is the number of people with home Internet connection in percentage of the 
total number of households, DRM Penetration is the number of DRM technology used on 
recording products by recording companies in percentage. The control variables should 
include GDP, Population, Domestic Piracy rate, etc.12 The dependent variable is 
Aggregate Music Sales, given in total units of pre-recorded music sales.  
 V = F(DRM , Internet,GDP, Population, Piracy...)                                (1) 
Besides, the availability of file sharing is the same for all countries although the 
quality of MP3 files may differ if the ownership of CD writers and MP3 players differs. 
Since I have no information on these latter factors we assume that the quality of MP3 
files is the same for all countries. In the analysis below, I assume that any behavioral 
difference across countries is random.   
To estimate the effect of DRM technology on music sales, I analyze whether 
                                                 
12  See Appendix 1 
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countries with a higher DRM penetration rate have obtained lower drops in music sales 
during the period it is implemented. The following equation is used to estimate the 
model, in which the demand for music in country i and year t is determined by:  
            log(V )it = α t + β(DRM )it + δ log(X )it + ε it                                                            (2) 
where log(V )it  denote music sales in log units in country i, i=1,2…,n, at time t 
α t represents a vector of constants, X is a group of other controls (Population, GDP, 
Domestic Piracy rate). Finally, εit  is an unobservable variable with mean 0 and 
varianceσ 2 .         
The summary statistics are shown in Table 6.1. It presents summary statistics for 
the 15 countries by year. There are less than 105 observations listed per year because 
empty cells for any variable were taken to indicate imprecision in the data and led to the 
elimination of the country.13  
Though DRM technology is not implemented in the same year for all countries, 
but we can see the usage of it in 2007 is twice of that in 2003. The share of Internet users 
doubled from 2001 through 2007, reaching a level of just over 67% in 2007. Downloaded 
music sales rose from 2001 to 2007 and increased significantly, while the greatest 
increasing range for the digital music sales is over 300%. However, the decline in CD 
sales is getting bigger every year, especially the last three years. Singles sales also fall as 
well as CD’s, but the range of change is not big. DVD sales keep waving up and down 
                                                 
13  The data for DRM penetration were missing in the first two years because most countries in 
the database implemented this technology in the early or late half of 2003, only USA and Japan 
begun to use such systems before 2001. Besides, many of the data for downloaded music unit 
sales were also missing before 2003. 
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and don’t have a stable trend. As expected, demographic variables such as the population 
of each country, or domestic piracy rate changed very little over this short interval. 
Based on the results of summary statistics, the impact of DRM technology on CD, 
DVD, Singles and digital music is not significant to observe. Therefore, it should be 
clearer if we focus on DRM impact on the total music sales and related factors. For this 
purpose, I amended the dependent variable into two forms to estimate the effects of DRM 
technology: 
(1) Unit Sales. It’s defined as the sum of four formats of music unit sales in each 
year by country:  
             U= CD + DVD + Singles + Digital Music 
(2) Price of Unit Sales. It’s defined as the average price for four formats of 
music: 
      P=V/U 
Besides, I add two control variables Year and DRM dummy14 into the equation 
(2) to get a fixed effect, since the database contains data in both years and countries. 








+ δ log( X )
it
+ γ Year + φD + ε
it








+ δ log( X )
it
+ γ Year + φD + ε
it
                                   (4) 
The summary statistics of new variables are listed in Table 6.2, which is sorted by 
                                                 
14  This dummy variable is defined as “if a country has implemented DRM technology more than 
4 years, then D=1, if the period is less than or equal to 4 years, then D=0”. This dummy variable 





First, I investigate in the correlations of all variables and the results are shown in 
Table 6.3. The first row of Table 6.3 shows a Year trend of other variables: GDP per 
capita, Internet Penetration and DRM dummy are positive correlated to Year 
significantly, which means the number of these three variables will be higher as years 
pass by. Though Population and Total unit sales variable are also positive correlated with 
Year, the results are not significant at all; on the contrary, Total music sales in value, 
DRM penetration rate and Price are all negatively correlated with Year, though not 
significantly. The number of these three variables might decline in the future based on 
these results.  
For the purpose of this paper, I also focus on the relationship between music sales 
and DRM Penetration. From this table, we can see from the last three columns that DRM 
Penetration has positive correlations with both Total music sales in value and Total unit 
sales significantly, so it gives us a simple idea about the impact of DRM technology in 
the music industry that it probably can increase the music sales as expected. It is also not 
hard to observe that the correlation between DRM Penetration and D (DRM dummy) is 
not very significant. It might be because they are both indicators to estimate the impact of 
DRM, and it is easy to generate a repeated effect in the regression. Moreover, the 
Domestic Piracy variable is not significantly correlated to both DRM Penetration and D, 
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so I decide to drop these three variables separately in the regression model. 
Table 6.4 is the results of running regression on equation (3) and (4) with 
different dependent variables and control variables. The dependent variable of the first 
columns is P, the price of total music sales. In Column 1, I dropped the DRM Penetration 
variable and the result shows that the relationship between Price and DRM dummy is 
negative but not significant, while the effects of Population and GDP are both significant. 
Column 2 represents a regression without DRM dummy variable, and the result is similar 
to Column 1 except the Internet Penetration also has a negative and significant 
relationship with Price. In Column 3 and 4, I run the same regressions as the first column 
but dropped Domestic Piracy at the same time, as we can see, the Year control variable 
becomes negative significant in these regressions. To sum up, DRM Penetration, DRM 
dummy variable and Domestic Piracy show insignificant relationship with the Price of 
total music sales. At the same time, a higher value of Price of total music sales is related 
to higher rate of GDP per capita in a country, countries with larger population or higher 
Internet Penetration have lower value of Price of total music sales. Besides, the Price may 
also drop as years pass by. 
Then I redo the same regressions as in the first four columns except the dependent 
variable is the Unit music sales (U).  On one hand, the results of Colum 5 and 6 show that 
higher domestic piracy rate is related to a lower number of Unit Sales when the DRM 
Penetration variable or the DRM dummy is dropped, and a higher population in a country 
is highly related to a higher number of the Unit Sales. However, the GDP variable isn’t 
related to the Unit Sales in these two columns. The possible reason might be because the 
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GDP variable and Domestic Piracy variable is highly correlated, making it difficult to 
identify this effect. The sign of their coefficient suggests that an increase in GDP reduces 
the marginal impact of piracy on sales.  On the other hand, Colum 7 and 8 also dropped 
domestic piracy. The DRM Penetration and DRM dummy variable are still have no 
significant relationship with the Unit Sales; the Population, GDP and Internet Penetration 
are all positive and significantly related to the Unit Sales, while the Year variable has a 
negative and significant relationship with the sum sales.  
The symbol of the estimation on Internet penetration is switching from negative to 
positive between the first four columns and the last four columns. The possible reason for 
this is because music consumers can hear or purchase music products in more and more 
channels with the convenience of fast internet connection, so it boosts the unit sales, 
while the increasing competitions force the music price to decline. 
According to the regression results, we can hardly find any significant 
relationship between DRM technology and the music sales as expected, while the key 
indicators related to music sales are Population, GDP per capita, Domestic Piracy rate 
and Internet Penetration. 
Of course, models such as these are likely to provide unreliable results. The 
number of observations per year is too small for a reliable result, and there are many 
differences across countries that are not taken into account in these regressions, possibly 






According to the results of empirical analysis, we could not find significant effect 
of DRM technology on music sales, and there are many possible reasons for such effect. 
On one hand, although the recent DRM systems are proved to be highly effective in 
piracy issues for physical format music like CD or DVD, but technically it may also 
cause consumer’s computer system crashes and creating security risks. Some of the DRM 
systems may even be designed for recording companies to get customers’ information 
through its software. Besides, the interoperability problems trouble consumers who 
purchase physical music products with a DRM system -- the music cannot be played 
unless on a standard player. To solve the interoperability problems, security risks and 
other troubles, recording companies need to exploit new DRM technologies with better 
interoperability year by year, and the costs of such systems rise without an end. This part 
of technology costs will indirectly be imposed on customers using DRM systems, which 
will cause losses both to consumer surplus and social welfare. 
On the other hand, the online music market also suffers disadvantages from DRM 
technology, where DRM interoperability issues are among its core problems. Utilization 
of DRM technology would cause price discrimination. For example, a typical CD, which 
usually contains an entire album and includes packaging that is conveniently ported from 
one device to another, is priced much higher than a downloaded track from iTunes, which 
contains only a single song without packaging that is less convenient for porting. One can 
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imagine that producers will apparently implement DRM to charge different prices base 
on the frequency of the consumer would like to listen to a song or the complete album, 
and the user wishes to port the music from one device to another. While an economic 
analysis results in a “non liquet,” important values of a society call for a high level of 
DRM interoperability. The possible drawbacks of an interoperable DRM system do not 
outweigh its benefits. There exists only little evidence that higher levels of DRM 
interoperability will compromise security and user privacy, and some of the drawbacks 
are more closely related to the use of DRM as such rather than to the degree of 
interoperability. Finally, the negative impact of increased DRM interoperability on 
security becomes less persuasive in an environment in which DRM is used less and less 
to prevent piracy. 
Although I have listed quantities of drawbacks of DRM technology in music 
industry, the idea still exists that the birth of DRM technology has reasons to exist in the 
whole industry, if going to a wider audience I am certain there is a real blind spot where 
it comes to DRM.  To most people, the fact that the music is locked up or tied to a 
particular system is not something that consumers are aware of. That is the problem.  
Outside of a small circle of professional users, there isn't a real understanding of what 
DRM is, which means that as a whole, consumers don't really care about the issues.  
So, what effects would no DRM on music have? I think that while the music 
industry would fuss about losses due to piracy and there are losses indeed, I'm certain that 
these are small and akin to the kind of shoplifting losses that any bricks-and-mortar store 
has to suffer – the true effect would be pretty small.  Away with DRM would remove the 
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ripping the CD step out of the piracy workflow, but that is no major debate for any 
determined pirate. Again, to the consumers who like listening to music, I think that the 
effects would be negligible.  It would be harder to lose music because of a system crash 
and easier to share music between different devices without DRM, but I do not see this 
turning everyone into a pirate.  I wish that the recording industry would have more 





















Having examined the empirical and theoretical effects of DRM implementation 
on the music industry, we are left with a rather uncertain future. DRM may indeed tend to 
increase competition and diversity in the music industry. However, it is also quite 
possible that DRM implementation could not affect the trend of music sales significantly 
in the music industry. In this study, countries with higher DRM penetration are not shown 
to have higher increase or reductions in music sales. The key indicators for music sales 
are Population, GDP, Domestic Piracy rate and Internet Penetration. 
This empirical analysis combines a panel country-level data of total music sales in 
the past seven years. One problem with this approach is that many country-year 
observations on DRM penetration and music sales are missing. In addition, the same 
level of domestic piracy is often reported for different years -- especially for the most 
recent years. An update of this alternative identification strategy using more years might 
be desirable.  
Furthermore, interest in this topic is not exclusive to the music industry. Other 
digital copyrighted goods are also being swapped online (movies, software, games and 
books). The development of fast and convenient connections will very likely increase the 
importance of the impact of new protection technology on sales of these goods. More 
empirical studies are necessary to investigate the use of DRM technology in the future. 
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics  
  Obs. Mean Min Max Std. Dev 
Total music sales ($) 105 1873.02 67.00 13740.00 3069.04 
Single sales  (in millions) 104 24.55 0.02 104.50 28.45 
CD sales  (in millions) 105 101.76 53.66 881.90 182.04 
DVD sales (in millions) 104 4.53 0.01 29.00 6.69 
Digital Music sales (in millions) 80 32.27 0.37 868.40 110.21 
Total Unit Sales (in millions) 105 163.12 12.41 1472.11 282.06 
Price ($) 105 11.13 2.64 29.94 3.78 
Population (in millions) 105 56.46 5.32 303.80 71.89 
GDP per capita ($) 105 31624.88 13022.00 56975.00 9200.44 
Internet Penetration (%) 105 57.14 17.97 86.76 15.15 
DRM Penetration (%) 77 17.96 1.25 52.10 15.77 
Domestic Piracy (%) 105 10.44 3.70 30.80 8.21 
 








Table 6.2 Summary Statistics by Country 
Country Variable N Mean Min Max Std Dev 
USA Unit Sales 7 1139.15 962.53 1472.11 201.97 
 Price 7 11.01 7.04 13.75 2.42 
 Population 7 294.39 283.23 303.80 7.50 
 GDP per capita 7 39887.00 35289.00 45429.00 3851.40 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 63.99 49.76 71.24 7.53 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 42.96 35.27 52.10 6.01 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 4.22 4.00 4.50 0.17 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
JAPAN Unit Sales 7 309.95 282.18 348.74 19.85 
 Price 7 15.43 14.79 16.77 0.75 
 Population 7 127.40 126.92 127.80 0.28 
 GDP per capita 7 33686.86 30726.00 36006.00 1849.60 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 56.99 38.42 68.85 12.37 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 42.22 4.30 4.80 0.19 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 4.57 4.30 4.80 0.19 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
UK Unit Sales 7 274.04 255.80 301.73 14.78 
 Price 7 12.01 10.14 13.27 1.07 
 Population 7 59.96 59.30 60.90 0.70 
 GDP per capita 7 34520.00 24520.00 45607.00 7539.34 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 60.79 33.63 79.90 14.05 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 13.73 0.00 33.59 12.07 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 6.60 5.50 7.40 0.68 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
GERMANY Unit Sales 7 189.67 162.20 235.30 28.05 
 Price 7 11.26 8.95 13.23 1.69 
 Population 7 79.11 60.10 82.50 8.30 
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 GDP per capita 7 31313.57 22890.00 40182.00 6117.30 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 60.96 49.00 75.73 9.60 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 14.89 0.00 34.46 12.83 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 4.41 4.00 4.70 0.23 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
FRANCE Unit Sales 7 142.62 91.30 171.40 29.70 
 Price 7 13.21 11.08 16.11 1.75 
 Population 7 64.29 59.24 82.50 8.25 
 GDP per capita 7 32161.43 22463.00 41508.00 6923.38 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 39.52 26.99 51.21 9.21 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 16.42 0.00 36.20 15.37 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 6.52 6.20 6.80 0.20 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
CANADA Unit Sales 7 71.38 58.70 90.10 11.51 
 Price 7 9.31 6.77 10.78 1.55 
 Population 7 32.10 30.75 33.40 1.11 
 GDP per capita 7 25960.00 14199.00 38974.00 7705.63 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 61.45 0.00 29.70 9.63 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 13.28 0.00 29.70 13.10 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 5.38 4.90 6.20 0.50 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
AUSTRALIA Unit Sales 7 66.83 61.70 73.47 4.13 
 Price 7 8.98 8.02 11.43 1.23 
 Population 7 19.88 19.13 20.60 0.54 
 GDP per capita 7 27400.57 19103.00 37083.00 7502.32 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 60.47 53.00 70.50 5.55 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 8.96 0.00 21.06 9.72 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 4.47 4.10 4.80 0.25 
 DRM Dummy 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
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ITALY Unit Sales 7 45.80 42.33 51.78 3.36 
 Price 7 12.77 9.52 15.29 1.90 
 Population 7 57.76 57.30 58.40 0.43 
 GDP per capita 7 27783.00 19289.00 35945.00 6001.14 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 42.57 26.99 52.91 9.35 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 14.21 0.00 27.70 12.43 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 27.47 25.00 30.80 2.12 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
NETHERLAND Unit Sales 7 32.87 21.40 38.23 5.56 
 Price 7 12.11 10.69 13.28 3.43 
 Population 7 14.97 7.20 16.60 3.43 
 GDP per capita 7 35731.86 25013.00 47312.00 7815.27 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 70.38 49.43 96.76 13.06 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 12.07 0.00 32.70 13.30 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 14.61 14.00 15.70 0.61 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
SPAIN Unit Sales 7 51.09 34.72 73.53 15.16 
 Price 7 10.56 8.33 12.89 1.82 
 Population 7 41.71 39.91 45.20 2.17 
 GDP per capita 7 23393.00 14781.00 32479.00 6386.10 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 37.95 17.97 58.69 14.68 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 16.18 0.00 36.90 15.65 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 23.84 21.50 25.40 1.50 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
AUSTRIA Unit Sales 7 15.41 12.50 18.90 2.32 
 Price 7 18.57 13.39 29.63 5.63 
 Population 7 8.00 7.20 8.20 0.36 
 GDP per capita 7 32799.00 23768.00 39439.00 6101.29 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 49.11 37.00 61.00 9.99 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 15.90 0.00 40.10 15.52 
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 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 4.08 3.70 4.50 0.37 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
BELGIUM Unit Sales 7 30.32 23.90 38.80 5.93 
 Price 7 8.94 5.96 11.45 1.73 
 Population 7 10.37 10.25 10.70 0.15 
 GDP per capita 7 32552.00 22373.00 43871.00 7597.73 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 52.46 30.97 67.00 11.87 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 18.40 0.00 42.00 16.82 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 10.10 9.10 11.80 1.09 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
SWEDEN Unit Sales 7 33.54 29.56 37.18 3.22 
 Price 7 7.44 5.54 9.25 1.34 
 Population 7 8.92 8.83 9.00 0.08 
 GDP per capita 7 37292.86 25299.00 49821.00 8655.36 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 78.52 51.58 86.00 11.49 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 8.18 0.00 39.90 0.38 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 8.18 7.60 8.70 0.38 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
DENMARK Unit Sales 7 21.27 12.41 29.52 6.19 
 Price 7 9.03 5.74 13.47 2.92 
 Population 7 5.40 5.32 5.50 0.07 
 GDP per capita 7 43141.14 29950.00 56975.00 9810.93 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 71.58 42.91 84.90 14.35 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 16.31 0.00 34.20 14.15 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 6.25 6.00 6.60 0.23 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
TAIWAN Unit Sales 7 22.67 15.20 28.38 4.73 
 Price 7 5.89 2.63 12.38 3.40 
 Population 7 22.62 22.28 22.90 0.27 
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 GDP per capita 7 16748.43 13022.00 34998.00 8066.75 
 Internet Penetration (%) 7 53.68 34.90 65.70 10.46 
 DRM Penetration (%) 7 21.41 0.00 20.63 7.87 
 Domestic Piracy (%) 7 25.78 21.40 28.13 2.61 
 DRM Dummy 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
  Year 7 2004.00 2001.00 2007.00 2.16 
 
Source: IFPI report 2001-2007, Yearbook of Census Bureau. 
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Table 6.3 Correlations of Variables 
















YEAR 1.000 -0.033 0.042 -0.074 0.013 0.608 0.603 0.659 -0.076 0.000 
  0.740 0.673 0.456 0.894 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001 0.441 1.000 
Total Music sale 
($) -0.033 1.000 0.914 -0.375 0.971 0.253 0.077 0.522 -0.335 0.245 
 0.740 <. 0001 0.093 <. 0001 0.009 0.433 <. 0001 0.001 0.016 
Total Unit sales 0.042 0.914 1.000 -0.261 0.921 0.263 0.130 0.455 -0.237 0.164 
 0.673 <. 0001 0.007 <. 0001 0.007 0.187 <. 0001 0.015 0.095 
Price -0.074 -0.375 -0.261 1.000 -0.457 0.185 0.083 -0.196 -0.198 0.040 
 0.456 <. 0001 0.007 <. 0001 0.059 0.397 0.045 0.042 0.684 
Population 0.013 0.971 0.921 -0.457 1.000 0.200 0.020 0.532 -0.224 0.261 
 0.894 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001  0.041 0.840 <. 0001 0.022 0.007 
GDP per capita 0.608 0.253 0.263 0.185 0.200 1.000 0.685 0.649 -0.471 0.273 
 <. 0001 0.009 0.007 0.059 0.041 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001 0.005 
Internet 
Penetration  0.603 0.077 0.113 -0.242 0.020 0.685 1.000 0.438 -0.374 -0.145 
 <. 0001 0.433 0.252 0.130 0.840 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001 0.140 
DRM Penetration  0.659 0.522 0.455 -0.196 0.532 0.649 0.438 1.000 -0.286 0.281 
 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001 0.045 <. 0001 <. 0001 <. 0001  0.003 0.004 
Domestic Piracy  -0.076 -0.335 -0.237 -0.198 -0.224 -0.471 -0.374 -0.286 1.000 -0.277 
 0.441 0.001 0.015 0.042 0.022 <. 0001 <. 0001 0.003  0.004 
DRM Dummy 0.000 0.245 0.164 0.040 0.261 0.273 -0.145 0.281 -0.277 1.000 
  1.000 0.016 0.095 0.684 0.007 0.005 0.140 0.004 0.004   
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Table 6.4 Regressions of Unit Sales and Price  
  Price Unit Sales 
  Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 Reg6 Reg7 Reg8 
Log of Population 0.048 0.040 0.052 0.043 0.985 0.997 1.009 1.013 
 0.027c 0.033 0.028c 0.033 0.028a 0.034a 0.038a 0.045a 
Log of GDP per capita 0.674 0.639 0.749 0.720 0.206 0.235 0.654 0.753 
 0.147a 0.144a 0.140a 0.133a 0.153 0.149 0.191a 0.183a 
Internet Penetration (%) -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.017 
 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003b 0.003a 0.004a 0.004a 
Domestic Piracy (%) -0.007 -0.006 na na -0.041 -0.041 na na 
 0.004 0.004 na na 0.004a 0.005a na na 
DRM Penetration (%) na 0.001 na 0.002 na -0.002 na 0.001 
 na 0.003 na 0.003 na 0.003 na 0.005 
DRM Dummy -0.020 na 0.003 na -0.010 na 0.129 na 
 0.089 na 0.088 na 0.092 na 0.120 na 
Year -0.032 -0.038 -0.044 -0.050 -0.081 -0.073 -0.145 -0.149 
 0.020 0.024 0.019b 0.022b 0.02a 0.024a 0.026a 0.030a 
R2 0.937 0.938 0.911 0.927 0.937 0.937 0.889 0.888 
Adj. R2 0.933 0.933 0.913 0.923 0.933 0.933 0.884 0.882 
Number of Obs. 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
 
Reg1 to reg4: the dependent variable is log of Price of total music sales. 
Reg5 to reg8: the dependent variable is log of unit sales. 





















• Aggregate Music Sales: CD, DVD, Single sales are counted in million units based 
on the RIAA Yearbook. 
• DRM Penetration: defined as the share of DRM technology implemented on 
recorded music products. This statistic is estimated in IFPI annual report. Internet 
Penetration may capture the substitution with the interaction of digital technology 
and record companies.  
• Digital music sales: defined as the number of music files downloaded in MP3 
format from the Internet at least once. This variable serves as a proxy for online 
end-user piracy but does not completely capture the intensity of the downloading 
activity: ideally, this number should be obtained by year, but before 2003, legal 
downloads were almost inexistent. Online music stores backed by major 
technology and retail company only app eared in the second quarter of 2003. Only 
the data of USA and Japan can be found in RIAA and RIAJ’s yearbook. 
• Population: defined as the number of individuals on recorded in each country, 
collected from Census Bureau of USA.  
• GDP (in constant US dollars per capita) captures the economic environment.  GDP 
data are from the Census Bureau except for Taiwan for which we gathered 
compatible information from the Economist Intelligence Service 
• Domestic Piracy: defined as the percentage of pirate music products and illegal 
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infringements in the total sales of recorded industry. It includes physical piracy 
and Internet piracy; the data are estimated by IFPI anti-piracy research center. 
• Internet Penetration: defined as the number of people with home Internet 
connection in percentage of the total number of households. Internet Penetration 
partly captures the substitution with new forms of online activities, such online 
games as well as audio streaming and legal downloads from commercial Internet 
sites. It may also partly capture the intensity of the downloading activity because 













DRM implementation Date 
Country   Implemented.                                                Date 
USA  Yes 5/14/1998 
JAPAN  Yes 1/25/1999 
UK  Yes 10/31/2003 
GERMANY  Yes 9/13/2003 
FRANCE  Yes 4/25/2003 
CANADA  Yes 3/10/2003 
AUSTRALIA  Yes 1/19/2004 
ITALY  Yes 4/9/2003 
NETHERLANDS  Yes 9/1/2004 
SPAIN  Yes 8/22/2003 
AUSTRIA  Yes 7/1/2003 
BELGIUM  Yes 1/15/2002 
SWEDEN  Yes 11/9/2003 
DENMARK  Yes 12/22/2002 
TAIWAN  Yes 9/1/2004 
 
* The EUCD has not yet formally implemented DRM. Nevertheless, present legislation 
transposes the directive's provisions at least in part.   
* Japan has actually run a very similar system since the early half of 1993, but Sony was 
the first company implementing DRM technology officially in 1999, so it is believed as 
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